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Two of the approaches at the forefront of contemporary sociological  interest  in 
meaning,  symbolic  interactionism  and  structuralism,  share   an  interest   in  the  role 
of signs and symbols in social life, yet take radically  different  standpoints concerning 
the nature of signs and the locus of meaning. Symbolic  interactionists  stress  the 
ongoing process of the "situation" as the determinant of meaning,  whereas  structur- 
alists claim that meaning must be sought at the deeper level of "system" or "structure" 
rather than at the  surface.  By  comparing  some  foundational  concepts  underlying 
these traditions, such as the nature of  the sign in  Peirce and Saussure  and  Durkheim 
and Mead, and then exploring recent developments in structuralism and symbolic 
interactionism, a critical appraisal of  their  theories  of  meaning  is made in the context 
of an emerging semiotic sociology. 
The Significance of Meaning 
For years neglected as a central sociological concern,  the question  of  meaning 
has reemerged with a vengeance and now is demanding some kind  of  answer 
from those who would further social theory. Two of the approaches at the fore- 
front of contemporary interest, symbolic interactionism and structuralism, claim 
that meaning forms the very basis of society, not instincts or genetics, materialist 
economics, or asocial psychological laws; and that the foundation of meaning is 
the sign or symbol. These approaches by and large reject the idea that social 
science is a search for empirical causal "facts," and in quite different ways they 
argue that "values" are  what  we  are  really  after-that  "significance"  binds 
society together. One persistent problem in these and other interpretive ap- 
proaches is the locus of meaning: whether it is to be found in existential and  
unique "situations" or in a deep-rooted system or code, i.e., a "structure." By 
comparing and contrasting some foundational concepts,  such  as  the  nature  of 
the sign, and then exploring  recent  developments  in  symbolic  interactionism 
and structuralism, I hope to  evaluate  critically  their  strengths  and  weaknesses 
in the context of an emerging semiotic sociology. 
The term symbolic interactionism was formulated by Herbert  Blumer  (1969:  
1) to reflect the milieu of social theory developed primarily at the University of 
Chicago in the early part of the century. Blumer himself cites the pragmatists 
William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, a number of Chicago 
sociologists including W. I. Thomas, Robert E. Park, Florian Znaniecki, Robert 
Redfield, and Louis Wirth, and also Charles Horton Cooley and James Mark 
Baldwin as among those who significantly contributed to the foundations of sym-
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bolic interactionism. The common theme uniting these theorists is an emphasis on 
the situational context of meaning-a view of meaning as a communicative pro- 
cess located in interpretive acts, whose study demands close attention to the 
uniqueness and variability of situations as well as to the way situations reflect 
habitual attitudes of mind. W. I. Thomas, influenced by his friend and colleague 
Mead, as well as by Dewey and James, developed an explicitly "situational" ap- 
proach to sociology that stated: "If men define situations as real, they are real in 
their consequences. The total situation will always contain more and less subjec- 
tive factors, and the behavior reaction  can  be studied  only in connection  with 
the whole context, i.e., the situation as it exists in verifiable, objective terms, and 
as it has seemed to exist in terms of the interested persons" (Thomas and Thomas, 
1970:154-55). Thomas's two-sided concept of situation as the configuration of 
conditioning factors both selectively defined by the person and shaping behavior 
(Thomas, 1966:154-67) reveals a concern somewhat similar  to  Weber's  con- 
cept of action as both subjectively intended meaning oriented, to a conditioning 
"outer world" of objects and processes of nature and as meaning determined 
through objectively rational means (Weber, 1981; Levine, 1981:10). The con- 
temporary symbolic interactionist sees interaction itself as the medium of the 
symbolic process and for this reason has been criticized as both atheoretical and 
unsystematic, as illustrated by Lewis Coser's extremely negative  comments 
(1976: 156-57): 
 "Blumer and his co-thinker wish, in fact, to teach a lesson of humility to the socio-  
logical theorist, who is seen as incapable of constructing enduring, objective, theoreti- 
cal structures, but who must, in their view, be attentive to the subjective interpreta- 
tions, the definitions of the situations, and the emergent meanings that arise in human 
interaction and be content with that. Needless to say, though functionalists have 
availed themselves of many particular  insights provided by Mead and his successors 
in the elucidation of social-psychological processes, they have rejected, as a kind of 
scientific Luddism, the extreme idiographic and antitheoretical bias inherent in sym- 
bolic interactionism. They, as well as other critics, have asserted that this orientation 
prevents the understanding of  social  structures and their constraining characteristics 
or of patterns of  human organization such as class hierarchies or power constellations." 
"French" structuralism has developed largely out of the ideas generated by 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Emile Durkheim and his circle, and more  recently, Claude 
Levi-Strauss. In Levi-Strauss's definition of the term "social structure," one sees 
how structuralism stands in opposition to symbolic interactionism: "The term 
'social structure' has nothing to do with empirical reality but with models which 
are built  up after it.... It will be enough  to state at this time that social 
relations consist of the raw materials out of which the models making up the 
social structure are built, while social structure can, by no means, be reduced to 
the ensemble of social relations to be described in a given society" (1967:271). 
Levi-Strauss views the goal of social science as the achievement of an under- 
standing of the invariant laws of thought, the "deep structure" that provides the 
ordering of meaning and therefore of society  itself  (e.g., 1966:263-64).  His 
heavy reliance on Saussure's concepts of the sign and of meaning as based on 
binary  opposition,  as well as his attempts  to seek  a scientistic universal logic  as 
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the ultimate basis of society, has drawn negative criticism from Clifford Geertz 
similar to that of Coser's concerning  symbolic interactionism, but for  precisely 
the opposite reasons (Geertz, 1973:355): 
"It is all terribly ingenious. If a model of society which is "eternal and universal" can 
be built up out of the debris of dead and dying societies-a model which reflects nei- 
ther time, nor place, nor circumstance  but  (this from Totemism)  "a direct expression 
of the structure of the  mind  (and  behind  the  mind,  probably  of  the  brain")-then 
this may be the way to build it. 
For what Levi-Strauss has made for himself is an infernal culture machine. It annuls 
history, reduces sentiment to a shadow  of  the  intellect,  and  replaces  the  particular 
minds of particular savages  in  particular  jungles  with  the  Savage  Mind  immanent  in us 
all." 
Neither the extremes of a structuralist "infernal culture machine" nor a sym- 
bolic interactionist "scientific luddism" can provide the comprehensive theory of 
meaning that seems to be the goal of the ongoing restructuring of social theory 
(Bernstein, 1976; Geertz, 1980). Yet these two traditions  cannot  be  reduced 
solely to the work of Levi-Strauss and Blumer, and by exploring the concept of 
sign and the locus of meaning in the foundations  of  the symbolic interactionist 
and structuralist traditions, I hope to trace the parallel threads of situation and 
structure that define each tradition. 
Peirce and Saussure on the Sign: Semiosis versus Structure 
Let us begin the discussion of symbolic interactionism and structuralism by ex- 
amining their foundations in the definitions of the sign given by semiotic and semi- 
ology. The sources of symbolic interactionism can be traced, through Chicago 
sociology, to pragmatism, whereas the origins of structuralism are often atttrib- 
uted to Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913). For many contemporary symbolic 
interactionists, pragmatism means  the work  of  Mead, who emphasized  the role 
of gestural signs and significant symbols located in communicative acts. Yet social 
scientists and those interested in semiotic are  becoming  increasingly  aware  of 
the contemporary relevance of C. S. Peirce (1839-1914), who not only founded 
pragmatism but also founded modern sign theory, which he termed semiotic (see 
Rochberg-Halton and McMurtrey, 1982). Peirce's interest in signs was little ap- 
preciated in his lifetime, and one of the ironies of modern social theory is that the 
bulk of both Peirce's semiotic and Saussure's semiology was published posthu- 
mously (and in Saussure's case, was based on lecture notes). By exploring the 
Peircean and Saussurian definitions of sign and meaning the contrasts between 
situationalists and structuralists should become more apparent. 
Saussure viewed the sign as consisting of  the two-sided signified  and  signifier 
("I call the combination of a concept and  a sound-image  a sign,"  1966:67). In 
this perspective, meaning occurs through binary opposition within a system: "In- 
stead of pre-existing ideas then, we find in all the foregoing examples values ema- 
nating from the system. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is under- 
stood that the concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive 
content but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their 
most  precise characteristic is  in being  what  the others  are not"  (1966:117). The 
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very basis of meaning in the Saussurian model is difference (see Barthes, 1977),  
for "In language, as in any semiological system, whatever distinguishes one sign 
from the others constitutes it. Difference makes character just as it makes value 
and the unit" (Saussure, 1966:121). 
Peirce defined the sign as a triadic process rather than a dyadic structure and 
viewed meaning as essentially relation rather than difference: "A sign ... is 
something which stands to somebody  for something in some respect or capacity. 
It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent 
sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the in- 
terpretant of the first sign. The  sign  stands for  something,  its  object. It  stands 
for that object, not in all respects but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have 
sometimes called the ground of the representamen" (1931-35, 2.228).  Peirce 
argued that a sign only has meaning in the context of a continuing process of in- 
terpretation. Because each sign is part of a continuous temporal process of inter- 
pretation, his theory is intrinsically processual and thus incompatible with 
Saussure's dyadic and intrinsically  static  theory  (see  Singer,  1977). The  arrow 
of time, the diachronic, is ultimately separable from the underlying system or 
synchronic dimension in the Saussurian view. The continuity of the temporal in- 
terpretive process assures freedom in the pragmatic tradition (e.g., Mead's 
"emergent present") but '"cancels freedom" (Saussure, 1966:78)  for Saussure in 
the sense of limiting the rational arbitrariness of language and the sign. 
Saussure's emphasis on the arbitrariness of the sign and the context of cultural 
conventions as the sole basis for a sign's "reference" can be seen as an argument 
against the side of nominalism that holds that only individuals or particulars are 
real, and that signs ultimately refer to these particulars. Only differences within 
the language system constitute meaning, Saussure (1966) assures us, and "we 
shall find nothing simple in it regardless of our approach; everywhere and always 
there is the same complex equilibrium of terms that mutually condition each 
other. Putting it another way, language is a form and not a substance. This truth 
could not be overstressed, for all the mistakes in our terminology, all our incor- 
rect ways of naming things that pertain to language, stem from the involuntary 
supposition that the linguistic phenomenon must have substance" ( p. 122). Lan- 
guage is like a single sheet of paper with an inseparable obverse and reverse, 
thought and sound, signified and signifier, whose combination produces a form 
and not a substance. This "linguistic fact" explains the arbitrariness of the sign: 
"Not only are the two domains that are linked by the linguistic fact shapeless 
and confused, but the choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is 
completely arbitrary. If this were not true, the notion of value would be compro- 
mised, for it would include an externally imposed element. But actually values 
remain entirely relative, and that is why the bond between the sound and the 
idea is radically arbitrary" (p. 113). The arbitrary nature of the sign, Saussure 
continues, "explains in turn why the social fact alone can create a linguistic sys- 
tem. The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to 
usage and general acceptance are to be set up; by himself the individual is in- 
capable of fixing a single value" (p. 113). Saussure argued for one of the basic 
tenets of semiology, structuralism, and poststructuralism: that the system or 
structure and not the individual person or instance constitutes meaning. Not even 
the linking of a certain sound with a certain concept determines value, because 
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this isolates the term from its system: In fact we begin with the interdependent 
whole and through analysis, rather than through the synthesis of individual ele- 
ments, obtain the elements of the sign (p. 113). Hence meaning resides wholly 
within langue (the general language system), not parole ( the actual speech 
act). In the Saussurian view any given instance of communication has 
significance by virtue of its underlying structure, not by virtue of the uniqueness 
of the situation. Though Saussure's approach seems to argue against one strain 
of nominalism 
( the tendency that led to British empiricism and resulted in "naive realism" and 
Carnap's logical positivism, see Carnap, 1967), it can be argued that Saussure re- 
tains a basically nominalistic theory of meaning, one that claims to reside on the 
nominal side of mind rather than on the physicalistic side of "body," and which 
retains the nominalistic tendency to dichotomize thought and things, system 
and instance, social and individual, fact and value. Saussure held a variation of 
the Kantian view that we only know the world through the categories of thought 
and not as it is apart from mind. In a way Peirce agreed with Kant's idea that our 
knowledge of the world is constrained by the laws of mind, yet he differed in al- 
lowing that the laws of mind are objective products and refractions of the general 
laws of nature. It should be remembered that nominalism holds that only par- 
ticular instances are real, and that signs are arbitrary names for these instances. 
Where scholastic realists such as John Duns Scotus held that some signs (or gen- 
erals) are real, nominalists such as William of Ockham (famous for his scientific 
"razor") denied the reality of signs, arguing that although all thought is in signs, 
these signs are mere arbitrary conventions for real individual instances. In this 
way nominalism, the philosophical basis for modern Western thought and cul- 
ture, drove a wedge between thought and things. Saussure, from this perspective, 
is thoroughly nominalist in agreeing that values are entirely relative and radically 
arbitrary, "mere names," having no "substance," and that all meaning resides in 
the conceptual system of language and not at all in any given instance of speech 
or action. In contrast, Peirce's pragmatism (later dubbed "pragmaticism" to dis- 
tinguish it from what he considered distortions in James and others), which 
forms one domain within his wider theory of signs, is at root based on a thor- 
oughgoing criticism of nominalism and its dichotomizing tendencies (Rochberg- 
Halton and McMurtrey, 1982). 
To return to Peirce's definition of the sign, each sign consists of  three ele- 
ments: the ground, which stands for its object, to some other  interpreting  sign,  
the interpretant. The middle element of the Peircean sign, the object, is not in- 
cluded in the Saussurian conceptual-psychological definition of the sign. The 
ground, or inherent quality of the sign, would come closest to Saussure's signifier, 
the formal phonetic and graphic structure of the sign, and the interpretant would 
come closest to Saussure's signified, i.e., the meaning conveyed by the structure. 
Yet each of these elements of the Peircean triad is quite different from Saussure's 
scheme. The ground of a sign is the inherent quality of the sign, which represents 
through its own qualitative possibility rather than through opposition. The inter- 
pretant is not limited to arbitrary concepts in the Peircean scheme but may in- 
clude nonconceptual emotions or physical action. lnterpretants are not solely 
examples of arbitrary conventions but have as their aim the growth of reasonable- 
ness through the future interpretants they will determine. Reasonableness, in 
Peirce's view, is real rather than arbitrary or nominal. 
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Peirce distinguished many kinds of signs on the basis of his categories of "first- 
ness," "secondness," and "thirdness," and perhaps the most well known is his 
trichotomy of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs. Peirce's term symbol most 
closely approximates Saussure's arbitrary sign (Saussure uses the term symbol 
in approximately the opposite sense of Peirce, however, as an example of a less 
arbitrary or "motivated" sign). A symbol, in Peirce's view, is given its meaning 
by its interpretation as a law, general rule, or convention. A symbol is what 
Peirce referred to as a type, a general regularity that will determine specific in- 
stances, called tokens (1931-35, 4.537). This distinction appears to resemble 
that of Saussure between langue and parole, except that in Peirce's view the in- 
stance is itself a general or a sign communicating information. An orchestral 
score, for example, is a type capable of determining many different kinds of per- 
formances, all of which are tokens of the score. Strictly speaking, Saussure would 
not view the performance as meaningful in itself but only as an instance of the 
score, where the meaning resides. Peirce's inclusion of the token (or indexical 
sign) as a genuine mode of sign is an attempt to give account to existential mean- 
ing. Peirce also developed a third mode of sign functioning, which he termed the 
tone of a sign, which deals with the inherent quality of the sign as significative, 
apart from convention and logically prior to "opposition." Thus the tone of the 
performance of the symphony is its qualitative uniqueness considered in itself, 
apart from other performances. The tone of a sign is its inherent quality and 
unique character, and this is the level of esthetic experience in Peirce's semiotic. 
Peirce attempts to account for something not dealt with in structuralist ap- 
proaches, viz., how the immediate qualities of experience also can act as mediat- 
ing signs which impart information (Rochberg-Halton, 1982b). In the same way, 
Dewey's theory of the situation is based on the concept of "a pervasive and in- 
ternally integrating quality" (1960:180). Tokens point to their types, they are 
indexes or actualizations of the general type, but the tone of a sign is the unique, 
inherent character of that sign. There may be a type of painting called still life, 
there may be many tokens or instances of this type, but the unique realization of 
this type of painting is to be found in the tone or quality of those tokens. 
As with Saussure, individuality has no meaning qua individuality in Peirce's 
scheme, for all meaning is general and  all generals  are signs in Peirce's  view. 
But Peirce considers more phenomena as signs than does Saussure. Thus just as 
the communication of a type is a general, so also is the communication of an in- 
dividual token (or index) a general, and so also is the communication of tone or 
qualitative immediacy a general. For all communication is semiosis, the sign 
process, in which a representation of some object is communicated to some in- 
terpretant. Although unique character or quality of feeling does occur in the im- 
mediate present, it can also act mediately as a communicative sign, which Peirce 
termed the icon. What Peirce tried  to distinguish  in discussions  of  the icon, or 
the tone of a sign, was a qualitative mode of communication not reducible to 
conventions. Still lifes make use of conventions, yet their esthetic significance de- 
pends on the unique qualities conveyed, not on the conventions. Peirce's inclu- 
sion of the qualitative within  mediation  illustrates  why it is not only our ability 
to know (as Saussure would argue) that differentiates us from other animals but 
also our ability to communicate feeling. Great works of art give testimony to 
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(and even help create) the deepest expressions of human sentiment and do so 
through the qualities directly conveyed. 
We find then in the Peircean scheme a thoroughgoing attempt to undercut the 
dichotomizing tendencies of modern nominalism and a comprehensive theory of 
signs that accounts for how not only thought but also volition and feeling are in- 
volved in meaning. Peirce rejected the idea that meaning could be found only in  
an "underworld" of deep structure and, quite to the contrary, saw the ultimate 
outcome of all semiosis as the growth and embodiment of what he termed con- 
crete reasonableness, inherently of the nature of a community. His comments on 
the sign illustrate his views that instances are also general, and that the ultimate 
basis of meaning is not to be found in arbitrary conventions per se but in the 
correctible process of interpretation that will "live down  all  opposition"  and 
which in his view can grow into a true convention (1976, 4:262): 
It is of the nature of a sign to be an individual replica and to be in that replica a 
living general. By virtue of this, the interpretant is animated by the original replica, or 
by the sign it contains, with the power of representing the true character of the object. 
That the object has at all a character can only consist in a representation that it has 
so-a representation having power to live down all opposition. In these two steps, of 
determination and of correction, the interpretant aims at the object more than at the 
original replica and may be truer and fuller than the latter. The very entelechy of 
being lies in being representable.... A symbol is an embryonic reality endowed with 
power of growth into the very truth, the very entelechy of reality. This appears mysti- 
cal and mysterious simply because we insist on remaining blind to what is plain, that 
there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol. 
In this way the Peircean view of signs leads to a very much different view of 
tradition and social conventions than that given by Saussure and consistently fol- 
lowed by structuralists and poststructuralists, who stress arbitrariness. Though 
Peirce admits the arbitrariness of traditions and social conventions, he also admits 
the role of experience, the brute factuality of  the world in time,  as also shaping 
and informing traditions. In the Peircean view traditions are neither solely arbi- 
trary deep structures with no purpose or inherent quality of  their own  nor, as  
some symbolic interactionists might argue, reducible to the whims of  individuals 
in specific situations. Traditions are the source of the common sense, general 
habits forged through the experiences of generations, and in practical life, far 
superior as the relatively unquestioned basis for orientation than the mere arbi- 
trariness of reason. Peirce developed a view he termed "critical  common- 
sensism," which was an attempted synthesis of the insights of the Scottish "com- 
mon-sensists" and the critical philosophy of Kant and his heirs,  and  which 
allowed that traditions themselves are subject to correction and growth through 
criticism. What further distinguishes Peirce's "critical common-sensism" from 
structuralism is that sentiment may provide a valid form  of  inference  in  the 
affairs of practical life, in other words, that sentiment is intelligent. 
 
Durkheim and Mead: The Structure of Collective Representations and the 
Process of the Generalized Other 
The next "moment" in our discussion of the foundations of symbolic interaction- 
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ism and structuralism is the relationship between the social theories of represen- 
tation proposed by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and George Herbert Mead (1863-
1931). Whereas Saussure and Peirce discuss the sign in its linguistic and logical 
contexts, Durkheim and Mead discuss the sign in its social web. Durk- heim's 
concept of "collective representations" is frequently compared to Mead's concept 
of "the generalized other" (Hinkle, 1960:277-79; Parsons, 1960:144; Lewis and 
Smith, 1980; cf. Stone and Farberman, 1970). The two concepts do share a number 
of similarities, for example, the emphasis on the generality and communicability 
of representations or signs, the view of the self as formed in social interaction 
through the internalization  of  representations, and  especially the idea that 
"collective representations" and "the generalized other" act as the signs through 
which society represents itself to itself, thus reproducing itself. Durkheim and 
Mead also share an emphasis on the objectivity  of  signs  that forms a critique of 
their intellectual progeny. Durkheim has been criticized by Levi-Strauss and other 
structuralists for undervaluing the role of arbitrariness in social conventions, yet he 
could not accept the all-out  assault on the "empirical" by recent structuralists and 
poststructuralists (e.g., Manning, 1978; many of the chapters in Rossi, 1982). 
Durkheim's concept of collective representations and general philosophy was, after 
all, an attempt to reconcile positivism with idealism (e.g., Durkheim, 1965:32). 
Though Durkheim argued that the arbitrary social conventions of a culture are not 
solely reducible to empirical conditions or in- dividuals, he allowed that 
institutions are tempered by experience (1965:14). Similarly, a collective 
representation "presents guarantees of objectivity by the  fact that it is collective: 
for it is not  without  sufficient  reason  that it has been able to generalize and 
maintain itself with persistence. If it were out of  accord with the nature of things, 
it would never have been able to acquire an extended  and prolonged empire over 
intellects ... a collective representation is necessarily submitted to a control that  is 
repeated  indefinitely;  the men who accept it verify it by their own experience" 
(1965:486). 
Durkheim did not seem to account for the fact that institutions and collective 
representations, like individuals, are subject to error, and that it may take cen- 
turies or more to correct false beliefs, but his point is that the accumulated exper- 
ience of a people does place some limitations on the arbitrary character of 
conventions, so that conventions in effect have a "reality" as social facts. Similarly 
Mead did not share the reservations concerning objectivity expressed in recent 
symbolic interactionism, because his philosophy in general was an attempt to 
develop an objective theory of meaning-to see nature itself as general, and as 
giving rise to mind. In the pragmatic tradition, as mentioned previously, con- 
ventions, though largely arbitrary in character,  are  cultural  habits  determined 
not by their arbitrariness but by the goals they  represent.  Despite  numerous 
points of agreement, Durkheim and Mead ultimately diverge for the same reasons 
as do Saussure and Peirce; the former seeing a priori structure, the latter seeing 
goal-directed sign process as the basis for meaning. 
Durkheim elaborated his theory of collective representations in his last major 
book, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, where he sought the founda- 
tions of religion, which, in his view, constituted the fundamental institution of 
human life. His inquiry would seek fundamental universal conceptions, a point  
that reappears in Levi-Strauss and other structuralists: "At the foundation of all 
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systems of beliefs and of all cults there ought necessarily  to be a certain number  
of fundamental representations or conceptions and of ritual attitudes which, in 
spite of the diversity of forms which they have taken, have the same objective 
significance and fulfill the same functions everywhere. These are the permanent 
elements which constitute that which is permanent and human in religion; they 
form all the objective contents of  the idea  which  is expressed  when one speaks 
of religion in general" (Durkheim, 1965:17). 
Because Durkheim believed complex religions-such as those of great civil- 
izations-were formed out of such varieties and hybrids that one could hardly 
distinguish "the essential from the accessory," he sought the simplest religions 
through which to discover the "elementary forms." In considering religious belief 
as reducible to universal fundamental representations he went in the opposite 
direction from Max Weber, who sought in his studies of the religions of China, 
Judaism, Christianity, and India  the  variety  and  complexity  of  human  social 
life in its cultural specificity (see Giddens, 1979:107-108, for a critical commen- 
tary on Durkheim's method). 
Durkheim (1965:15, 16) described his method as similar to that of Descartes, 
which consisted in founding the inquiry upon a "cardinal conception," a "primi- 
tive" concept, except Durkheim based his inquiry on a "concrete reality," dis- 
covered through "historical and ethnological observation": 
 
Every time that we undertake to explain something human, taken at a given 
moment in history ... it is necessary to commence by going back to its most primitive 
and simple form.... Itwas one of Descartes's principles that the first ring has a 
predominating place in the chain of scientific truths. But there is no question of 
placing at the foundations of the science of religions an idea elaborated after the 
Cartesian manner, that is to say, a logical concept, a pure possibility, constructed 
simply by force of thought. What we must find is a concrete reality, and historical 
and ethnological observation alone can reveal that to us. But even if this cardinal 
conception is obtained by a different process than that of Descartes, it remains true 
that it is destined to have a considerable influence on the whole series of propositions 
which the science establishes. 
 
Even though observation, as opposed to introspection, is needed to discover 
an elementary form, it remains true for Durkheim that the elementary provides 
the a priori foundation of meaning, the underlying structure upon which all later 
developments appear as "secondary," mere "accretions" and "luxuriant vege- 
tation" (1965:17). And as with Saussure, it is the form and not the substance 
that constitutes the representation. Durkheim stated that symbols not only 
represent social life ("clarifying the sentiment society has of itself") but also 
create social life and shape its sentiments. Yet the action of the symbol is caused 
by its social form, not by its substance, in other words, by the ideal "super- 
structure" considered as separate from its material embodiment. 
Durkheim (1965: 260) viewed the objects of experience ultimately as mere 
manifestations of the idea, and the  idea  alone  as the locus of  reality. Although 
we live in a physical world and need to embody symbols in material forms, the 
importance of the symbol lies not in a particular physical object but in the in- 
tangibility of the "superstructure," or what contemporary structuralists term the 
"deep structure": 
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Thus there is one division of nature where the formula of idealism is applicable 
almost to the letter: this is the social kingdom. Here more than  anywhere else, the  
idea is the reality. Even in this case, of course, idealism is not true without modifica- 
tion. We can never escape the duality of our nature and free ourselves completely  
from physical necessities: in order to express our own ideas to ourselves, it is neces- 
sary, as has been shown above, that we fix them upon material things which symbolize 
them. But here the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object serving as 
support for the idea is not much in comparison with the ideal superstructure, beneath 
which it disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the superstructure ... for the  
ideas thus objectified are well founded, not in the nature of the material things upon 
which they settle themselves, but in the nature of society. 
Durkheim illustrated his argument for the idealism of things with examples of 
objects that may be endowed with  sacredness  for arbitrary  reasons or that may 
be subdivided with each part possessing the full sacred character  of  the whole. 
For instance, relics of a saint or fragments of a flag may be regarded as fully 
sacred as the whole objects from which they derive because their significance 
consists in being embodiments of the ideal superstructure, not in their inherent 
properties. We see here the same nominalistic point made by Saussure, viz., the 
conventional system is the locus for meaning and not particular instances. When 
the "object serving as support for the idea ... counts for nothing in the super- 
structure," when it "disappears" as Durkheim says, then we are left with an 
environment which is a mere fa ade. 
Although Durkheim's discussion  of  the arbitrary  selection  and "sacredness" 
of objects-the representative power  of  society  itself-is  a  valuable  insight,  it 
also highlights the limitations of a purely conventional account  of  meaning.  
From this perspective, the vast array of ritual artifacts and practices  of  the 
cultures of the world are not meaningful in their own right  but only insofar  as 
they carry out various cultural beliefs that ultimately have the sole purpose of 
representing the ideal superstructure of society. Similarly Durkheim viewed 
human nature as essentially dualistic, consisting of individual body and social 
soul, and he saw the task of collective representations as bringing the asocial 
aspects of  individual  consciousness  into communion  with  social consciousness 
( 1965 :262-63). In his 1913-14 lectures on pragmatism, which concentrated 
primarily on James, less so on Peirce, Dewey, and F. C. S. Schiller, and do not 
mention Mead, Durkheim goes so far as to say (1960:430): 
 
... This pressure that truth admittedly exercises on minds is itself a symbol that must  
be interpreted, even if we refuse to make of truth something absolute and extra- 
human. 
Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself of the means of making this 
interpretation by failing to recognize the duality that exists between the mentality 
which results from individual experiences and that which results from collective 
experiences. By contrast, sociology reminds us that what is social always possesses a 
higher dignity than what is individual. 
Durkheim maintained a Kantian-based position by claiming  that  otherwise 
asocial individuals are "synthesized" into the social through mediating collective 
representations, rather than seeing, as the pragmatists did, that the individual 
human being is already a social sign "analyzed"-or in Peirce's terminology, 
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prescinded-from the ongoing process of mediation. Human individuality is a 
consequence of, not a condition prior to, collective representations. 
Peirce, Dewey, and Mead,  although sharing Durkheim's  insight  that sociality 
is fundamental to representation, argued that the individuality of a person ( and 
even the biological body) is a social outcome and not an a priori given, and that 
every sign (or sign act) has its own quality which is involved in the sign's signifi- 
cance to a greater or lesser degree, and which constitutes a genuinely different 
mode of signification from that of purely conventional accounts (Rochberg- 
Halton, 1982b). Instead of seeing the "ideal superstructure" as something apart 
from its physical manifestations and individual members, they all stressed, as we 
see in Mead's concept of "the generalized other," that  a collective representation, 
as well as an individual person, is a social dialogue of signs. 
Like Peirce and Dewey (Dewey, 1925; 1958), Mead argued  that there is more 
to significance than purely conventional meaning. Mead's "conversation of ges- 
tures" (derived from Wundt), although retaining the idea that signification is a 
communicative dialogue, holds that the generality of gestural communication is 
found in the gestures themselves, i.e., in their instances or  what  Peirce termed 
their "indexicality," and that this level of signs is not limited to human intelli- 
gence. Mead's concept of "the generalized other" derives from his attempt to 
develop a broad theory of sociality that could include reflective intelligence as an 
emergent property of nature. The generalized other differs from Durkheim's 
collective representations because the mere existence of collective  represen- 
tations as structures does not make them social, rather, "collective representa- 
tions" arise in and through communication-through a process of role taking 
(Duncan, 1962:92). Whereas Durkheim found the ideal level of the representa- 
tion, apart from its manifestation, to be the true locus of sociality,  the  prag- 
matists attempted to undercut the modern dichotomies of thought and action, 
individual and social, by  viewing  mind  as  a social,  communicative  act. Mead, 
as a pragmatist, defined structure itself as a communicative social process of role 
taking, and thereby (1938:612-13): 
In social conduct the individual takes the attitude of another in a co-operative 
process. If there are a number of persons engaged in the  process, he must in some 
sense take the attitude of all of them. He accomplishes this in getting  the attitude 
which each assumes in relation to the common end which each has. He finds an 
identical element in the attitude of each, which expresses itself in the different responses 
of the individuals. It is his ability to go from  one of  these attitudes  to another  in so 
far as each calls out the other that constitutes the structure of the system which im- 
ports the group into his experience. 
The individual is an element in that communicative process which consists in 
the determination of a common end through internalizing the perspectives of the 
others who comprise the group. This communicative process, which Mead said 
"constitutes the structure of the system," is in fact his concept of "the generalized 
other." Structure is not a timeless, passive entity in this view, but an ability, 
capable of real growth and decay. And structure is not dichotomized from its 
manifestations but includes its "instances" and embodiments, as Mead said in a 
criticism of Alfred North Whitehead: "For him (Whitehead) these relations 
constitute the individual but do not appear as other things in its experience; the 
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world constitutes the thing but does not appear in the thing. In our experience the 
thing is there as much  as we  are here-our  experience  is in the thing as much  as 
it is in us. Organization is being in a number of things at  the same time. We  
attain this through participating in organized reactions of groups-the common 
content makes it possible to take the different attitudes and keep their relations. 
The organization is that of the act" (1938: 613). 
Pragmatism frequently has been caricatured as a philosophy of individualism, 
and one can see  how structuralists might  object  to  Mead's emphasis on society 
as a process of  individuals  internalizing  attitudes, but Mead's generalized  other 
is not reducible to determinate individuals per  se. For  the generalized  other is 
that sign dialogue that constitutes reflective thought, consisting in the dialogue 
between social self and social environment and internally between the inter- 
pretive spontaneity of the "I" and the organized and internalized others com- 
prising the "me." Thought itself is an internal dialogue for Mead, as it is  in 
James's theory of self that Mead inherited, and in Peirce's semiotic. Thus Mead 
could say in the previous quotation, "our experience is in the thing as much as it is 
in us," for it is in the communicative act as a whole (including its consequences), 
and not solely in an individual or social subject, that meaning is located. This is 
further illustrated in Mead's comments on the objective significance of situations 
as communicative acts (1964:245, 247): 
 
But signification is not confined to the particular situation within which an indi- 
cation is given. It acquires universal meaning. Even if the two are the only ones 
involved, the form  in which it is given is individual-it would have the same meaning 
to any other who might find himself in the same position. How does this generaliza- 
tion arise? From the behavioristic standpoint it must take place through the individual 
generalizing himself in his attitude of the other.... Mind, which is a process within 
which this analysis and its indications take place, lies in a field of conduct between a 
specific individual and the environment, in which the individual is able, through the 
generalized attitude he assumes, to make use of symbolic gestures, i.e., terms, which 
are significant to all including himself. 
 
Unlike Durkheim, Mead argued that not only other persons but also physical 
objects could act as true elements of the generalized other, and that the cult, 
instead of being reducible to an underlying elementary form or structure, acts as 
the means for a dialogue between a social group and its environment (1934: 
154n): 
 
Any thing-any object or set of objects, whether animate or inanimate, human or 
animal, or merely physical-toward which he acts, or to which he responds, socially, is 
an element in what for him is the generalized other....Thus, for example, the cult, 
in its primitive form, is merely the social embodiment of the relation between the 
given social group or community and its physical environment-an organized social 
means, adopted by the individual members of that group or community, of entering 
into social relations with that environment, or ( in a sense) of carrying on conver- 
sations with it; and in this way that environment becomes part of the total generalized 
other for each of the individual members of the given social group or community. 
The  generalized  other  of  a  child,  said  Mead,  is  variable  and "answers  to the 
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changing play of impulse," yet even this level of the generalized other is universal 
in form. Whereas Durkheim argued that the varieties of religious life mask the 
underlying universal, Mead argued that varied experience and differences refine 
the universal: "Education and varied experience refine out of it (the generalized 
other) what is provincial, and leave 'what is true for all men at all times' " (1964: 
245). The generalized other asserts increasingly universal standards as it grows, 
standards that impart objectivity to the given situation,  and  whose  realization  it 
is the task of the situation to achieve. This is not the colorless, bland, unmediated 
objectivity proclaimed by positivism and denounced by many structuralists and 
symbolic interactionists, but an objectivity whose elements (the individuals and 
their indications) form perspectives within it and give it the character of a medi- 
ated unity. 
 
Toward the Structured Situation? 
Recently there has emerged what has been termed "poststructuralism," a 
pastiche of scholars whose work stems from the assumptions of French struc- 
turalism and Saussure's semiology, but who have attempted to link this style of 
thought  with  other  significant  intellectual movements, such as Marxism 
(Althusser, 1979; Godelier, 1970, 1982), or, as in the case of Jacques Lacan, 
with Freudianism. At their best these hybrid developments offer fresh new per- 
spectives, but all too frequently some merely restate the basic structuralist premise 
that the foundation of social life resides in an "underworld" of deep structure. 
The question of structure versus situation as the locus of meaning is particularly 
apparent in the work of "structural Marxists," such as Maurice Godelier or Jean 
Baudrillard. One would think that Marx's lifelong concern with developing the 
concept of praxis (Bernstein, 1971:13; con. Althusser, 1979) would link him 
with the pragmatists, who similarly sought to view meaning as a form of intelli- 
gible conduct, i.e., praxis, rather than with structuralists, who deny continuity 
between meaning and experience. Yet what structuralists find relevant in Marx 
is his emphasis that what is before our eyes is the veil of maya, an illusion ob- 
scuring the real workings of the "invisible" deep structure: "For Marx, as for 
Levi-Strauss, a structure is not a reality that is directly visible, and so directly 
observable, but a level of reality that exists beyond the visible relations between 
men, and the functioning of which constitutes the underlying logic of the system, 
the subadjacent order by which the apparent order is to be explained" (Godelier, 
1982:262-63). 
Marx's idea that the product of labor is the objectification of  the laborer, and 
that specific historical conditions may distort that relationship of objectification, 
producing alienation and the fetishizing of commodities, is denied by Godelier, 
who says instead that the fetishizing of commodities is "the effect in and for 
consciousnesses of the disguising of social relations in and behind their appear- 
ances" (1982:268). In other words it is the "true, underlying logic of the system" 
that is essential, not the objectifying process  of  praxis.  Indeed  Godelier  says 
that the aim of science is theoretical knowledge of the deep structure (1982:267) 
and in so doing merely replaces the dichotomies of empty idealism and blind 
materialism Marx himself was trying to overcome as is clear in the following: 
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"Their resolution  is therefore by no means merely  a problem of  knowledge, but  
a real problem of life, which philosophy could not solve precisely because it 
conceived this problem as merely a theoretical one" (Marx, 1972:75). 
Jean Baudrillard's program in his For a Critique of the Political  Economy of 
the Sign (1981) is to press beyond Marx, by showing how the critique of the 
commodity form in Marx  needs to  be  reconceived  in a more pervasive critique 
of the sign, because in his view all objects are fundamentally the outcome of a 
"generalized code of signs": "one forgets that what we are dealing with first is 
signs: a generalized code of signs, a totally arbitrary code of differences, and that 
it is on this basis, and not at all on account of their use values or their innate 
'virtues,' that objects exercise their fascination" (p. 91). Baudrillard puts the 
concept of code to work in his provocative studies of consumption,  the signa- 
tures of paintings, the "potlatch" quality of art auctions, and the system of interior 
design. Although tending to agree with Marx's criticism that the exchange  of 
goods constitutes a general sign system of values rather than utilitarian facts, 
Baudrillard claims that  Marx should have pressed  his criticisms further, and that 
if he had, he would have seen, as a kind of born-again semiologist, that even use 
values and needs derive from the generalized sign code rather than provide the 
material basis of it. System, and not nature,  therefore, constitutes the sole source 
of meaning. Yet although Marx may be criticized for being influenced  by  the 
very utilitarianism he was arguing against, it is not clear as Baudrillard would 
would have it that Marx only saw nature in its  modern  mechanical  sense. In 
many ways Marx's theory of meaning is broader than Baudrillard's and other 
structural Marxists precisely because  he included  nature, in Aristotle's sense of 
the perfection of being, within the realm of  meaning  (Rochberg-Halton  in  
press). In seeing nature as purely mechanical and asocial, hence inadequate to 
account for the systematic essence of meaning as code, Baudrillard (and other 
structuralists, such as Marshall Sahlins, 1976a, 1976b) merely sits on one side of   
a dichotomy created by the very utilitarian world view he criticizes, thereby linked 
with his sociobiological and functionalist opposites. 
The fundamental idea of these varieties of structuralism is that meaning derives 
from an underlying system or structure. Surely this is a useful insight, yet the 
tendency to rigidly dichotomize meaning from experience need not be a necessary 
consequence. In the structural Marxism of Godelier and Baudrillard (see also 
Althusser, 1979; Gimenez, 1982) meaning does not include praxis. Structural 
Marxism therefore appears not to be a furthering of Marx's thought but what  
might be termed the fetishization of structure, in which Marx's "human sensuous 
activity, praxis" evaporates into meaninglessness. Like religion and money, 
structure is the sole currency of meaning and is surgically  removed  from  the 
flesh and blood of life and treated as a totally independent existence. 
Pierre Bourdieu has attempted to develop a less constricted position by turning 
to the concept of habitus as that which mediates "the system of objective regu- 
larities" and "the system of directly observable conducts" (1968, 1977). Though 
retaining the basic structuralist premiss that all knowledge is conceptual and 
systematic, and that even "experience is a system" (1968:683), Bourdieu criti- 
cizes both the purely situational approach  as  a false "realism  of  the element" 
and the purely structural approach as a "false realism of the structure": "With- 
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out falling back into a naive subjectivism or 'personalism,' one must remember 
that, ultimately, objective relations do not exist and do not really realize them- 
selves except in and through the system of  dispositions of  the agents,  produced 
by the internalization of objective conditions" (1968:705). Bourdieu's concern 
with meaning as habit, with the realization of structures through agents, them- 
selves produced by "the internalization of objective conditions," marks an im- 
plicit turning to precisely the central issues considered by the classic American 
pragmatists. 
In his book Vertical Classification: A Study in Structuralism and the Sociology 
of Knowledge (1981), Barry Schwartz uses the core  structuralist  concept  of 
binary opposition to its best advantage by examining systems of vertical classi- 
fication. Yet Schwartz also criticizes structuralism for  ignoring  the  specificity 
and context of meaning: "The problem with all structuralist approaches to the 
semiotics of knowledge is this: in reducing knowledge to an understanding of 
relationships rather  than things,  they fail to explain  why certain media  are used 
to encode specific kinds of information. Defining the relation between the signifier 
and signified as 'arbitrary,' structuralists close off rather than stimulate inquiry. 
They ignore the role of the medium in human conception" (p. 124). Schwartz's 
inclusion of empirical methods within his larger study also shows that a more 
flexible structuralist framework is possible. 
Another structuralist study that has concerned itself with the actualization of 
codes is S. N. Eisenstadt's (1982) "Symbolic Structures and Social Dynamics." 
There Eisenstadt takes a basically structuralist orientation toward social organi- 
zation, stating: "This analysis has indicated that, as in other spheres of symbolic 
patterning of human experience, it is the 'schemata' of the respective and not the 
'objective' contents of the objects of such experience that provides the decisive 
principles of cognitive and evaluative organization of human behavior, of the 
hidden structure or contexts of such behavior" (p. 172). Yet he also says that the 
schemata are not purely cognitive, "prelogical," or logical but are "closely com- 
bined with the more existential dimension of human life and social organization" 
(p. 172). Eisenstadt argues that the "instanciation" (i.e., embodiment or institu- 
tionalization) of social codes introduces elements of openness, choice, and un- 
certainty. Though code remains key, he argues from within a structuralist position 
that situation and concrete interaction give it variability and color and must be 
included within the analysis of any level of human activity. In dealing with the 
central problem of the relation of hidden structure to the actual workings of 
institutions, Eisenstadt implicitly turns to the vocabulary of symbolic interaction- 
ism, stressing the situational character of interpretation and the importance of the 
reconstruction of meaning: "The various symbols of collective and personal 
identity which are constructed in the process of institutionalization of such models 
and patterns of codes--even if they are taken out of the reservoir of traditional 
symbols-are rarely simply  given.  They  are  continuously  being  reconstituted 
and reconstructed" (p. 165). Eisenstadt clearly sees the limitations  of  a  model 
that must stop short of action and the significance of specific situations, a model 
that does not allow for the reconstruction of meaning ( a key term in Dewey's 
philosophy, and in Eisenstadt's usage strikingly similar to the symbolic inter- 
actionist concept of "negotiated order," Strauss et al., 1963; Glaser and Strauss, 
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1965). Yet  one might  argue  that by taking his insights further he might see that  
a more fundamental correction to the idea of deep structure realized in variable 
and reconstructed surface "institutionalizations" is needed. 
One should not assume, however, that all structuralism  needs to do to correct 
its limitations is to incorporate the insights of symbolic interactionism. Critics of 
symbolic interactionism have argued that it places too much weight on subjectivist 
transitory phenomena at the expense of enduring patterns of meaning (Meltzer, 
Petras, and Reynolds, 1977), and that it ignores social structure (Coser, 1976; 
Lewis, 1976; Stryker, 1980). In  a recent  article George Gonos  (1977)  attempts 
to show that Erving Goffman should be considered a structuralist rather than a 
symbolic interactionist because of his concern with "frame." Ganas attacks 
symbolic interactionism as an approach dedicate to the exotic and trivial (pp. 857-
58), as individualistic (p. 864), as unable to deal with the continuity of structures ( 
pp. 859-60), and as ultimately subjectivist. Gonos claims to use methodological 
hyperbole ( a strange method for an article concerned with the objectivity of 
meaning in symbolic interactionist and structuralist  approaches), and the 
argument suffers from excessive caricature and an inability to see that Mead, 
regardless of the directions his followers later took, attempted  to develop an 
objective theory of  meaning.  Yet  it  does underscore  some of  the problems in 
the symbolic interactionist view of the objectivity of the situation, for example, in 
"A Theory of the Definition of the Situation" (1967), Stebbins defines the meaning 
of a situation as consisting in its definition, which is a process of re- flection. Any 
changes in meanings or goals  are  found  in  the  definition  and  "not rooted in the 
experience  or information  per se"  (p.  162). The consequence of Stebbins's 
definition is a return to precisely the kind of mentalism the prag- matists sought to 
avoid, a separation of the self from the medium  of  signs in which it exists (cf. p.  
157;  Perinbanayagam,  1974:523-24)  and  a  reversal  of the pragmatic view of 
thought as a form of internal conduct to one of a person projecting subjective 
meanings onto conduct. As mentioned, others have criticized the symbolic 
interactionist tendency to overemphasize  the subjective  choice of the person in a 
given situation at the expense of the objective preconditions and consequences of 
actions taken, but, according to Maines (1977), those symbolic interactionists 
using the concepts of "negotiated order" and "structural process," such as Strauss 
and Glaser, avoid this tendency. 
A  major  controversy  in  symbolic  interactionism  has  emerged  recently con- 
cerning the objectivity of meaning. Much criticism has been directed at Herbert 
Blumer by the Illinois school of sociologists for his alleged subjectivizing of 
Mead's theory of meaning (Huber, 1973a,  1973b;  Lewis,  1976,  1977;  Lewis 
and Smith, 1980; McPhail and Rexroat, 1979, 1980; for countercriticism see 
Blumer, 1973, 1977, 1980; Johnson and Shifflet, 1981). Both Blumer and his 
critics share an almost mythic  attachment  to Mead as the central representative  
of pragmatism, and one hopes that the current questioning of roots will at least 
open up the relatively untapped ideas of Peirce and Dewey for contemporary 
social thought. In looking at Blumer's formulations of symbolic interactionism, 
however, there does seem to be room for criticism of his interpretation of Mead. 
Blumer attacks reductionism in social theory, arguing that societies and human 
beings cannot be explained alone by "social factors" (which would include 
structuralism)  or  by "psychological factors,"  rather,  human  societies are "com- 
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posed of individuals who have selves" (1969:83), and  that "group action  takes 
the form of a fitting together of individual lines of action" (1969:82). Blumer's 
language is excessively individualistic, making it sound as if one can be an indi- 
vidual apart from a self, as if society is a mere aggregate of individual choices 
rather than itself a kind of larger self that can determine "individual  lines of 
action" (the point made so well by structuralists). One  could  argue  that  in 
Mead's view society is the generalized  other,  a self  in its own  right,  and  that  
the individual self is a microcosm of society, the internalized generalized other. 
Blumer constantly discusses the role of choice and conscious interpretation in 
conduct, and perhaps this can be seen as a turning away from the pragmatists' 
central concept of habit. Nevertheless, he reveals an understanding of the way 
habitual conventions or "structure" enter into the situation (1969:86, 88) : 
Usually, most of the situations encountered by people in a given society are defined 
or "structured" by them in the same way. Through previous interaction they develop 
and acquire common understandings or definitions of how to act in this or that situa- 
tion. . . . Social organization enters into action only to the extent to which it shapes 
situations in which people act, and to the extent to which it supplies fixed sets of sym- 
bols which people use in interpreting their situations. 
Criticisms of Blumer from University of Illinois sociologists have centered on 
his conceptions of objectivity and his alleged misinterpretations of Mead. Joan 
Huber (1973a, 1973b) charged  that Blumer and the pragmatists were not capable 
of scientific objectivity because they do not rely on a priori  theorizing.  In his 
reply Blumer noted that "the likelihood of introducing  unwitting  bias  is much 
less when the problem is developed through a close, flexible and reflective exam- 
ination of the empirical world than when the problem is formed by using a model 
not derived  through  such  intimate,  empirical  examination"  (1973:798).  In 
other words Blumer, like the pragmatists, stressed that scientific inquiry is a self-
corrective process, and that objectivity is assured by observation and cor- rection 
rather than by an a priori foundational approach. McPhail and Rexroat (1979, 
1980) attack Blumer for his emphasis on "sensitizing concepts" as mark- ing the 
beginning stage of inquiry, but in so doing reveal an ignorance of Peirce's theory of 
"abduction" or hypothesis  formation,  Dewey's  "problem finding," or the 
problematic situation in Mead, in other words, the discovery of the problem itself 
as the first stage of the inquiry. Lewis (1976, 1977) has developed the idea that 
Blumer has fundamentally misinterpreted Mead, and that Blumer's sub- jectivism 
is much closer to an alleged nominalistic pragmatism of James and Dewey (whom 
Lewis sees as biological individualists). 
Lewis's ideas concerning the objectivity of meaning in the pragmatic tradition 
are placed in a larger context in his recent book (Lewis and Smith, 1980). Lewis 
and Smith claim that  there  are  two  pragmatisms-a  realistic  one  characterized 
by Peirce and Mead  and  a nominalistic one (which Lewis and Smith claim has  
no value) illustrated by James and Dewey. They argue that Chicago sociology, 
including Blumer, was under the influence of the nominalistic pragmatism, and 
that Mead exercised little influence  during his lifetime.  The  argument  is based 
on an ahistorical, a priori "metatheoretical" realism-nominalism distinction that 
claims to be based on Peirce's discussions of realism  and  nominalism  (though 
one could argue that Peirce's method of pragmatism is antithetical to Lewis and 
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Smith's method of a priori  metatheory).  Pragmatism,  as  originally  formulated 
by Peirce, is clearly a variety of realism, a renovated version of the scholastic 
realism of John Duns Scotus rather than the modern nominalistic forms of "naive 
realism" that claim the basis for reason is to be found in particulars outside of 
reason (see Rochberg-Halton and McMurtrey, 1982). The introduction of the 
realistic roots of pragmatism to the sociological community marks an important 
turn in the questioning of the roots of symbolic interactionism, yet one in my 
opinion marred by Lewis and Smith's nominalistic interpretation of realism. 
Perhaps the clearest example of  their positivistic  and nominalistic interpretation 
of Mead (which would reduce the  context  of  situation  to an  epiphenomenon, 
"in name only") is found in their remarks ( 1980:130) that 
Ultimately, the meaning of a significant symbol must be grounded in the nonhuman 
world of pure resistance. We previously discussed the same point in connection with 
Peirce's theory of signs. The ultimate meanings of concepts must be located in some 
nonmental and nonlinguistic reality if we are to escape the infinite regress of verbal 
definitions of definitions of definitions, ad infinitum. . . . Mental objects must be 
referred to worlds that are not mental. 
Lewis and Smith do not realize that although Peirce and Mead agree that the 
physical is involved in the symbolic (e.g., "indexicality" or the "conversation of 
gestures"), the symbolic is not reducible to a nonsymbolic foundation. In contrast 
to Lewis and Smith, Peirce's argument for reality is based on an "infinite re- 
gress": all hypotheses must be capable of explanation because science does not 
admit the inexplicable. "Pure resistance" explains nothing qua pure resistance, 
hence cannot provide an acceptable hypothesis for the foundation of meaning. 
Moreover, the positivistic idea that meaning is based in individual reaction with 
an object is ultimately subjective, because it is based on a single person's exper- 
ience rather than on a normative conception of an unbounded community of 
inquirers capable of continuous inquiry and eventual agreement in the long run. 
The Lewis and Smith programmatic "metatheoretical" method leads them to 
serious distortions, pro and con, of pragmatists and Chicago sociologists, and 
their positivistic interpretations have been criticized in a number of reviews and 
articles (Johnson and Shifflet, 1981; Johnson, in press; Batiuk, 1982; Rochberg- 
Halton, 1982a, 1983; Campbell, 1982; Mills, 1982). What will be needed to 
counter both mentalistic subjectivism and positivistic subjectivism in symbolic 
interactionism is a rediscovery of the pragmatists' idea that the most fully objec- 
tive is the most fully mediated-that objectivity is the achievement, not the a 
priori foundation, of the sign process of inquiry. 
 
The Context of Meaning 
The turn toward  "meaning"  in  recent  sociological  theory  can  be seen  as both 
a rejection of reductionism and an attempt to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of society. Structuralists have argued for the general 
sign system as the source of meaning as opposed to specific enactments of the 
system; symbolic interactionists have claimed that only through specific inter- 
pretive situations can we appreciate the essence of meaning. Yet structures 
completely separate from content are empty; formless interactions blind. Para- 
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doxically, some recent criticisms from within structuralism have  attempted  to 
deal with the situational level as a corrective to what is perceived as an inflexible 
reduction to the general, whereas "objectivist" symbolic interactionists have tried 
to reformulate the "deep structural" foundations of symbolic interactionism as a 
corrective to what is perceived as a flaccid reduction to the particular. These 
developments suggest a growing need for a comprehensive theory of signs and 
society. 
Structuralism has claimed that action and speech are not of themselves mean- 
ingful, and symbolic interactionism has tended to side with the choices of social 
individuals to define meanings of situations, and in doing so both have under- 
estimated the role of community as the objective public realm that is the com- 
pelling source and aim of signs. In denigrating the concepts of action and public 
sphere as mere meaningless instances or illusions, structuralism destroys the 
possibility of politics and puts in its stead a hidden underworld of deep structure, 
insusceptible to correction and cultivation through the life of the community. For 
its part symbolic interactionism has frequently stressed the arbitrariness of the 
individual to create meanings at the expense  of  the real aims of  the community  
in which all situations are involved. Though the "native's" perspective in a given 
situation is a valid perspective in its own right, it is still subordinate to the inter- 
pretation of that situation by the "unlimited community." 
Although Saussure and Durkheim stressed the social nature of language and 
signs, both were limited by the dichotomizing tendencies of nominalism into 
viewing individual speech and individual cognition as asocial, and these dicho- 
tomizing tendencies have continued in later structuralists and poststructuralists. 
Mead, though stressing, with Peirce and Dewey, the thoroughly social nature of 
speech and cognition, developed an objective theory of meaning but not an  
explicit and comprehensive theory of signs. It was Peirce, the founder of prag- 
matism and semiotic, who articulated the broadest theory of signs, one that 
accounts both for system (considered as correctible habit) and  for  the unique- 
ness of the situation (i.e., all signs or "sign situations" possess their own inherent 
quality, as iconic signs), which is not "subjective" but is involved in the social 
meaning of the sign. Peirce also included existential  signs  (indexical  signs)  as 
yet another mode of semiosis reducible neither to deep structure nor to the sub- 
jective interpretation of the situation, and which compels the interpretation. A 
person may think himself or herself well, for example, but if a temperature read- 
ing taken from an accurate  thermometer  reveals  a very high  fever, that  person  
is compelled to reinterpret his or her situation. Similarly, though there may be a 
cultural convention of thermometers, the actual instance of a given reading com- 
municates meaningful information and is determined by the kinetic interaction of 
person and thermometer, not solely  by cultural  convention.  The sign registered 
on the thermometer is an indexical sign of the actual situation. 
In Peirce's semiotic each and every sign is social, and the sign process of 
interpretation is a critical process of self-correction, guided by an unbounded 
community of "inquirers." Peirce's semiotic is framed in a logical context, where 
questions such as the reality of the hardness of untested diamonds are in the 
foreground, and needs to be "translated" into the context of social theory, where 
the objects of inqury-human beings and institutions-unlike diamonds  are 
intelligent forms capable of self-induced change. Though it has not yet been 
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incorporated into social theory, Peirce's semiotic offers a genuinely new alterna- 
tive to existing theory and provides a radical critique of the guiding ideas of 
modem culture as a whole. Perhaps the concern with meaning that characterizes 
contemporary social theory signifies a readiness to go beyond the dichotomizing 
tendencies of modem thought. 
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